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ONE HUNDRED YEARS LATER:
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AFTER A
CENTURY OF RESEARCH
JON B. GOULD * & RICHARD A. LEO **
In this Article, the authors analyze a century of research on the causes
and consequences of wrongful convictions in the American criminal justice
system while explaining the many lessons of this body of work. This Article
chronicles the range of research that has been conducted on wrongful
convictions; examines the common sources of error in the criminal justice
system and their effects; suggests where additional research and attention
are needed; and discusses methodological strategies for improving the
quality of research on wrongful convictions. The authors argue that
traditional sources of error (eyewitness misidentification, false confessions,
perjured testimony, forensic error, tunnel vision, prosecutorial misconduct,
ineffective assistance of counsel, etc.) are contributing sources, not
exclusive causes, of wrongful convictions. They also argue that the
research on wrongful convictions has uncovered a great deal about how
these sources operate and what might prevent their effects. Finally, the
authors urge criminal justice professionals and policymakers to take this
research more seriously and apply the lessons learned from a century of
research into wrongful convictions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Almost a century ago in the predecessor to this Journal, 1 Yale law
professor Edwin Borchard kicked off the study of wrongful convictions in
the modern era 2 when he published an article on European approaches to
“unjust convictions.” 3 Almost a century later, professors Samuel Gross and
Barbara O’Brien published a critical assessment of the state of knowledge
on wrongful conviction. Arguing that researchers “do not know much
about false convictions” and that “it will be difficult to learn more,” they
concluded that the “main message is gloomy.” 4
Although both of us greatly respect the work of Gross and O’Brien—
indeed, Gross is a leading, perhaps even the leading, scholar in the field at
the moment—we disagree with their conclusion about the state of
knowledge. To be sure, questions remain about the representative
characteristics of all (i.e., known and unknown) wrongful convictions and
their prevalence, queries that may prove difficult ever to answer. Nor do
we yet have a good grasp on how the sources of wrongful convictions differ
from the frailties found in criminal cases as a whole. But to say we know
little about the subject, we believe, is not fully to appreciate the import of
decades of research on wrongful convictions, and especially some of the
most insightful work that has been conducted in the last two decades.
In this Article, we analyze nearly a century’s worth of research into
wrongful convictions, explaining the many lessons of this body of work and
suggesting where additional research and attention are needed. The Article
is divided into four sections. In Part II, we chronicle the range of research
that has been conducted over the last several decades and explain how it has
changed in form. Part III is the bulk of the Article and where we address
the challenge provided by Gross and O’Brien. We begin this section by
1
Until 1932, the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology was known as the Journal of
the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology.
2
Professor Bruce Smith traces interest in wrongful convictions back to seventeenth
century England, with many “influential treatise writers and public officials . . . urg[ing] the
courts [to] adopt stricter evidentiary safeguards in capital cases.” Bruce P. Smith, The
History of Wrongful Execution, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1185, 1188-89 (2005). In America,
Borchard’s article, and his later book, which is described in Part II, infra, are among the
earliest, most cited publications on wrongful convictions.
3
Edwin M. Borchard, European Systems of State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal
Justice, 3 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 684 (1913).
4
Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Convictions:
Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927,
958 (2008). Gross and O’Brien emphasize that there are no good case level data on accurate
criminal convictions in the United States, or on all criminal convictions, with which to
compare data on exonerations (which they treat as an imperfect proxy for a subset of likely
wrongful convictions that are known), and that 95% of known exonerations occur in cases of
murder and rape, which only account for 2% of all felony convictions. Id. at 937-40.
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acknowledging questions about the rate of wrongful convictions and argue
that, whatever the correct figure, wrongful convictions are far from rare in
the criminal justice system. We then turn to the effects of wrongful
convictions, describing the several harms of erroneous prosecutions and
convictions that researchers have identified. From there, we address the
sources of these errors and seek to categorize the various findings about
these factors. Our overall argument in this section is two-fold: first, we
should consider these factors as contributing sources, not exclusive causes,
of wrongful convictions; and second, the research has actually uncovered a
great deal about how these sources operate and what remedies might
prevent their effect.
Although the research has identified a common set of sources, we
agree with Gross and O’Brien that the methodology for studying wrongful
convictions could be improved. In Part IV we discuss those studies that
have used matched comparison samples and explain how the field could be
improved by additional research that employs such comparisons or controls.
Finally, in Part IV, we turn the tables, contending that improvement is
needed less in the quality of research than within the professional, policy,
and political communities that might employ the lessons learned from the
wrongful convictions research. With all of the information that has been
amassed over the last century of inquiry, it is embarrassing to the point of
shameful that criminal justicians, policymakers, and politicians do not
follow the example of other professions and seek to learn from and prevent
systemic error. 5 We have no doubt that researchers will continue to expand
our understanding of wrongful convictions in the years ahead. But unless
those charged with maintaining our criminal justice system are open to
those findings and are willing to act on the lessons learned, the research
may become, quite literally, an academic exercise.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF RESEARCH ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
In 1913, Edwin Borchard’s article opened the eyes of American
observers to the scourge of wrongful convictions by describing European
approaches to righting the wrongs of erroneous convictions.6 Twenty years
later, his book, Convicting the Innocent: Sixty-Five Actual Errors of
Criminal Justice, created a stir when it identified sixty-five cases in which
an innocent person had been convicted.7 Borchard also classified the likely

5

See James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice, 100 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (2010).
6
Borchard, supra note 3.
7
EDWIN BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL ERRORS OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932).
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“sources of error including erroneous eyewitness testimony, false
confessions, faulty circumstantial evidence, and prosecutorial excesses.” 8
Yet, for the next fifty years, research on wrongful convictions was sporadic.
“Typically, one big-picture book or major article [was] published every
decade or so on the subject of miscarriages of justice,” many of which
“followed a familiar structure.”9 Authors would assert the importance of
clearing the innocent; they would describe cases in which an innocent
defendant had been convicted; and they would close by proposing reforms
to prevent future errors. Among those who followed in this literary path
were Erle Stanley Gardner, creator of the fictional defense lawyer Perry
Mason, 10 and Judge Jerome Frank, who collaborated with his daughter
Barbara on the book, Not Guilty. 11
“Until the late 1980s, it might have seemed bizarre, if not incoherent,
to suggest that the study of miscarriages of justice constituted a field or area
of academic study, rather than merely a series of unrelated and relatively
infrequent articles and books.” 12 However, in 1987, Hugo Bedau and
Michael Radelet published their groundbreaking study in the Stanford Law
Review, claiming that 350 individuals had been wrongly convicted in
potentially capital cases over much of the twentieth century. 13 In addition
to describing the facts of these cases, Bedau and Radelet systematically
analyzed the sources of these errors and the methods by which the mistakes
had been discovered. Their work led to a florescence of research on
wrongful convictions, inspiring others to research and write about the
sources and consequences of wrongful convictions, 14 as well as to re-

8

Smith, supra note 2, at 1216.
Richard A. Leo, Re-thinking the Study of Miscarriages of Justice: Developing a
Criminology of Wrongful Convictions, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 201, 203 (2005).
10
Among other things, Gardner created the “Court of Last Resort,” an unofficial body to
investigate suspected cases of wrongful conviction. Steve Weinberg, A Short History of
Exposing Misconduct, in CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, HARMFUL ERROR: INVESTIGATING
AMERICA’S LOCAL PROSECUTORS (2003), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/
pm/default.aspx?act=sidebarsb&aid=37.
11
JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957).
12
Leo, supra note 9, at 204.
13
Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 23 (1987).
14
See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the
Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 907 (2004); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The
Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in
the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998).
9
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analyze 15 and extend their findings. 16 All the while, they have continued to
collect, analyze, and publish data about wrongful conviction cases.17
Bedau and Radelet’s article was followed in the 1990s by a series of
books on the subject.18 Often following a “familiar plot”19 of works like
Borchard’s 1932 book, these publications once again reminded the reading
public that wrongful conviction cases were real, that they contravened the
ideals of the American criminal justice system, that they had common
sources, and that these errors ought to be rectified. Yet, for the attention
these books may have received, everything paled in the face of the
revolution that arrived in the 1990s when DNA testing became feasible and
affordable in many cases. 20 Once limited to such imperfect techniques as
serology testing or hair comparison analysis,21 law enforcement officials
found that they could test biological evidence for common genetic links
between perpetrators and potential suspects, permitting results that were
15

See James Acker et al., No Appeal From the Grave: Innocence, Capital Punishment,
and the Lessons of History, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 154
(Saundra Westervelt & John Humphrey eds., 2001).
16
Samuel Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in
Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 494 (1996); see also Samuel Gross, Lost Lives:
Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (1998).
17
MICHAEL L. RADELET, HUGO ADAM BEDAU & CONSTANCE E. PUTNAM, IN SPITE OF
INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1992); Hugo Adam Bedau &
Michael L. Radelet, Convicting the Innocent in Capital Cases: Criteria, Evidence, and
Inference, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 587 (2004); Michael L. Radelet, William S. Lofquist & Hugo
Adam Bedau, Prisoners Released from Death Row Since 1970 Because of Doubts About
Their Guilt, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 907 (1996); Michael L. Radelet & Hugo Adam Bedau,
The Execution of the Innocent, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (1998); Michael L. Radelet,
The Role of Innocence Argument in Contemporary Death Penalty Debates, 41 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 199 (2008).
18
DONALD CONNERY, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: THE STORY OF A MURDER, A FALSE
CONFESSION AND THE STRUGGLE TO FREE A WRONGED MAN (1996); RONALD HUFF, ARYE
RATTNER & EDWARD SAGARIN, CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1996); MARTIN YANT, PRESUMED GUILTY: WHEN INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE
WRONGLY CONVICTED (1991).
19
By that, we mean descriptive analyses of harrowing cases of wrongful conviction.
These stories are often told in the style of “good guys” (the innocent defendant) succumbing
to the efforts of “bad guys” (hard-charging police officers or prosecutors), who ignore
exculpatory evidence, only to be freed by the efforts of dedicated advocates who never
doubted the innocence of the wrongly convicted. These stories usually close with
recommendations for “familiar policy solutions” to prevent future wrongful convictions.
Leo, supra note 9, at 207.
20
DNA testing of course became available both as an investigative tool in some cases
that have not yet gone to trial as well as in some postconviction cases. To date, virtually all
postconviction DNA exonerations have occurred in rape or rape and murder cases. Samuel
R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 528-29 (2005).
21
These and other forensic testing methods are discussed in Part II.C, infra.
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infinitely more accurate. Innocent defendants also recognized the potential
of DNA testing to clear them even after conviction if biological evidence
from the crime scene had been retained. In what appeared to be an
avalanche of cases over the next decade, advocates have managed to
exonerate over 250 innocent persons of crimes they had not committed,
including several defendants who had been on death row. 22 Even more
individuals have been exonerated in this period in cases not involving DNA
testing. 23
These cases rightly drew media attention to the frailties of the criminal
justice system and, perhaps more importantly, revealed serious problems in
everyday police work. In 1996, the National Institute of Justice released a
report noting that in “every year since 1989, in about 25 percent of the
sexual assault cases referred to the FBI . . . the primary suspect has been
excluded by DNA testing.” 24 Put another way, among rape cases referred
to the FBI for DNA testing, law enforcement officers had been wrong one
out of every four times in naming an initial suspect.
The advent of DNA testing not only generated more attention for, and
research about, wrongful convictions, but it also seemed to have pushed
academicians from “pure” research to research/advocacy. Here, the
influence of Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld cannot be underestimated.
Two former legal aid attorneys, the pair founded the Innocence Project in
1992 at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Today, the Innocence
Project (IP) is a non-profit legal clinic that “handles cases where postconviction DNA testing of evidence can yield conclusive proof of
innocence. As a clinic, students handle the case work while supervised by a
team of attorneys and clinic staff.”25 The IP has led successful efforts to
exonerate hundreds of innocent defendants. It also has spawned the
creation of regional innocence projects and legal clinics at law schools
around the country. Among the most famous is Northwestern University’s
Center on Wrongful Conviction and Medill Innocence Project, at which law
and journalism professors, along with their students and professional
journalists, were the catalysts for a statewide investigation into wrongful
convictions in Illinois. In an unprecedented move in 2000, then-Governor
George Ryan commuted all death sentences and imposed a moratorium on
22

See The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Apr. 3,
2010).
23
Gross et al., supra note 20, at 529 tbl.1.
24
EDWARD CONNORS, THOMAS LUNDREGAN, NEAL MILLER & TOM MCEWEN, CONVICTED
BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL xxviii (1996).
25
About the Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/ (last visited Apr.
3, 2010).
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further executions until a special commission and the General Assembly
addressed the several problems in investigations and prosecutions that had
led to more convicted murderers released from prison upon questions of
their guilt than actually executed over a twenty-two-year period. 26
Illinois is not alone; North Carolina, 27 Virginia, 28 and California have
also seen innocence commissions, modeled in many ways on the Criminal
Case Review Commission (CCRC) in the United Kingdom and the Royal
Commissions of Inquiry in Canada. The Royal Commissions have been
available for over a century, with national and provincial governments
permitted to conduct independent, nongovernment-affiliated investigations
regarding the conduct of public businesses or the fair administration of
justice. 29 Two of the most famous examples of the commissions were those
investigating the exonerations of Guy Paul Morin and Thomas Sophonow. 30
More recently, the U.K. established the CCRV in 1997. The CCRV has
jurisdiction over criminal cases from any Magistrates’ or Crown Court in
England, Wales, and Northern Ireland “to review possible miscarriages of
justice and decide if they should be referred to an appeal court.”31
As we discuss in a later section, 32 research has been instrumental in
assisting innocence or related government commissions to establish “best
practices” to prevent wrongful convictions, whether in the United States or
abroad. Among these best practices are sequential, double-blind eyewitness
identification procedures and electronically recorded interrogations.
Indeed, in many ways, we have reached the point where researchers are
now performing a dual function with regard to wrongful convictions; on
one level scholars are conducting research for its intrinsic insight into the
functioning of the criminal justice system; on another level, researchers
have become instruments of reform, working alongside policymakers to
26

Thomas P. Sullivan, Repair or Repeal: The Report of the Illinois Governor’s
Commission on Capital Punishment, 26 CHAMPION 10 (2002).
27
Although Illinois’s Ryan Commission often gets the most press coverage, in many
ways the North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission deserves greater attention since it
was the first in the nation and remains an ongoing entity. See Christine C. Mumma, The
North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission: Uncommon Perspectives Joined by a
Common Cause, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 647 (2004).
28
Unlike the other innocence commissions, the Virginia Innocence Commission was a
private organization, not a government commission. See JON GOULD, THE INNOCENCE
COMMISSION: PREVENTING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND RESTORING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (2007).
29
Watson Sellar, A Century of Commissions of Inquiry, 25 CAN. BAR REV. 1 (1947).
30
Barry C. Scheck & Peter J. Neufeld, Toward the Formation of “Innocence
Commissions,” 86 JUDICATURE 100 (2002).
31
Criminal Cases Review Commission, Our Role (Overview), http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/
about/about_27.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
32
See infra Part III.C.
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implement the lessons their research uncovers. That alone is a significant
step in the near-century of inquiry, one that Borchard hardly may have
expected when he first published his article in the predecessor to this
Journal. 33
III. WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
A. PREVALENCE OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

Despite the numerous studies into wrongful conviction, there remains
considerable debate about the extent of the problem. According to
University of Southern California law professor Dan Simon, the “overall
rate of error in the criminal justice system is unknown, and unknowable.” 34
Simon is correct that we may never know precisely how many wrongful
convictions occur, but already research has greatly narrowed the range.
Virtually no one denies the existence of wrongful convictions, while the
several studies on this question cap estimates at around 3% to 5% of
convictions. 35
Much of the variation in these estimates turns on the definition of a
wrongful conviction and the method of study. Initially, it’s important to
distinguish between procedural error (which some have referred to as “legal
innocence” 36) and factual innocence. The latter means that someone else
committed the crime, whereas the former penalizes the state for violating a
defendant’s fundamental rights by overturning the ensuing conviction and,
in some cases, ordering a new trial. Joshua Marquis, a district attorney
from Oregon, has decried the improper usage of “innocence” when
describing defendants who are released from prison on what some might
consider a “legal technicality.” Says Marquis, “To call a man with blood on
his hands innocent stains not only the truth, but calls into question the
actual innocence of the fewer number who are truly exonerated.”37

33

Borchard, supra note 3.
Dan Simon, Are Wrongful Convictions Episodic or Epidemic?, Paper Presented at the
Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association (July 7-9, 2006).
35
See Robert J. Ramsey & James Frank, Wrongful Conviction: Perceptions of Criminal
Justice Professionals Regarding the Frequency of Wrongful Conviction and the Extent of
System Error, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 436 (2007); see also Michael D. Risinger, Innocents
Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 768 (2007); Marvin Zalman, Brad Smith & Amy Kiger, Officials’ Estimates
of the Incidence of “Actual Innocence” Convictions, 25 JUST. Q. 72 (2008).
36
See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1560.
37
Joshua Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 501, 521
(2005).
34
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In several cases, factual innocence and procedural error coincide,
when, for example, the constitutional violations that produce procedural
error also lead to the conviction of a factually innocent person. But in
reviewing the literature on error rates, it’s important to keep the two terms
distinct. 38 In 2000, Professor James Liebman and colleagues published
their research on error rates in capital cases from 1973 to 1995. 39 The
researchers estimated that 68% of capital convictions “were thrown out
because of serious flaws” in the investigation or prosecution.40 But whereas
judicial reversal qualifies as at least procedural error, it does not necessarily
imply factual innocence. Indeed, the vast majority of capital defendants
who won on appeal in the study were tried once more, and upon retrial,
only 5% of the original total were “cleared of the capital offense.”41 Even
among this group, Liebman and colleagues were not able to identify or
estimate the number of defendants that were factually innocent.
Such distinctions should not imply that we disregard cases of
procedural error, unconcerned, as some might imply, that such “legal
technicalities” are hardly cause for alarm. Procedural error is a signal that
the criminal justice system has failed, but the failure is much more troubling
when the system convicts a person who is factually innocent. For this
reason, much of the research that has sought to estimate the rate of wrongful
convictions has focused on factual innocence. Huff, Rattner, and Sagarin
sought to answer this question by surveying prosecutors, defense attorneys,
judges, and sheriffs in seven Ohio cities about their familiarity with, and
estimates of, wrongful convictions. 42 Out of a sample of nearly two
hundred participants, approximately 70% estimated that wrongful
convictions occurred less than 1% of the time, 20% rated the frequency at
1% to 5% of cases, 2% said errors occurred between 5% and 10% of the
time, and 6% denied that wrongful convictions occur. 43 The weakness in
this research, of course, is that it merely asks respondents to speculate about
facts they likely do not know and, thus, reflects only their perceptions about
the frequency of the problem, not any underlying reality. 44
38

See Tony G. Poveda, Research Note, Estimating Wrongful Convictions, 18 JUST. Q.
689, 691 (2001).
39
James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, Capital Attrition: Error Rates in
Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839 (2000).
40
Id. at 1852.
41
Id.
42
C. Ronald Huff, Arye Rattner & Edward Sagarin, Guilty Until Proven Innocent:
Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 518 (1986).
43
Id. at 522.
44
In their 1996 book Convicted But Innocent, Huff et al. estimated the error rate at
0.05% (1 out of every 200 convictions). See HUFF ET AL., supra note 18, at 59-62. However,
this estimate reflects the collective speculation of some criminal justice officials in Ohio and
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A different approach seeks to chronicle the number of known
exonerations. Gross and colleagues did just this when, in 2005, they
published their research recounting 340 exonerations that took place
between 1989 and 2003. 45 But raw numbers alone may not pack the punch
they warrant, leading some, such as Justice Scalia, to dismiss these figures
as “fairly modest.” 46 Others, including Joshua Marquis, have sought to
extrapolate from these numbers, arguing that even if the authors understated
the results by a factor of ten, the data would still represent an error rate of
just 0.027% in felony convictions. 47
One must, of course, appreciate the limits of extrapolation. As Gross
notes, more than 95% of the 340 exonerations from 1989 through 2003 that
he and his colleagues uncovered came primarily from cases of rape and
murder, 48 “which together account for only 2% of felony convictions.” 49
Certainly, there are far more kinds of criminal prosecutions, but “lesser”
felonies, and certainly misdemeanors, may lack the record and interested
advocates to investigate and pursue exonerations. Moreover, the vast

some state attorneys general: it has no basis in observed fact. Huff et al. arrived at this figure
by asking fifty-five Ohio county judges, fifty-three prosecutors, twenty-one public
defenders, fifty-nine sheriffs and chiefs of police, and forty-one state attorneys general to
guess into which of four categories the error rate in the system most likely fell (“never,”
“less than 1%,” “1-5%,” or “6-10%”). Huff et al. then arbitrarily assigned the final number
as the midpoint between the two most frequently chosen categories—“never” and “less than
1%.” Because this estimate is based on the aggregated guesswork of some criminal justice
officials, it is not an empirically valid measure of the true error rate in the criminal justice
system. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda:
Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557 (1998). Two additional
recent studies have used the same methodology to arrive at equally speculative findings:
Ramsey and Frank surveyed 798 Ohio criminal justice officials (police, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and judges) and found that they perceived the error rate to be 0.5-1% of all felony
cases in their county and 1-3% in the United States. Robert J. Ramsey & James Frank, supra
note 35. Zalman, Smith, and Kiger surveyed 467 Michigan criminal justice officials (police,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges) who estimated that wrongful convictions
occurred less than 0.5% in their own jurisdiction and at a rate of 1-3% in the United States.
Zalman, Smith & Kiger, supra note 35, at 84. These findings do not reflect a precise,
underlying error rate in the real world of criminal justice, as they are essentially collective
guesswork.
45
Gross et al., supra note 20.
46
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 197 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).
47
Joshua Marquis, The Innocent and the Shammed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at A23.
Marquis has subsequently “refined [his] statistics” to estimate a wrongful conviction rate of
0.75%.
See http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2008/05/counting-innocent-discussionof.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2010).
48
Gross et al., supra note 20, at 529.
49
Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 173
(2008).
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majority of criminal prosecutions are concluded with guilty pleas, yet
research offers few glimpses into errors there.
For this reason, one must be extremely careful when evaluating claims
such as those of Marquis and Scalia who contend a 0.027% error rate. As
Simon explains, their analysis is “flat wrong and badly misleading. In fact,
[the error rate is] much higher.” 50 The “Scalia-Marquis ratio,” as Simon
calls it, divides the number of exonerations by the total number of felonies.
However, the numerator is likely many times larger than Marquis estimates,
and the denominator is several times smaller than he suggests. If, as Gross
reminds us, 95% of known exonerations come from rape and murder
cases, 51 then the denominator used by Marquis should be contracted fifty
fold to reflect the proportion of rape and murder cases among criminal
prosecutions as a whole. Furthermore, almost all exonerations in rape cases
came from crimes in which the perpetrator and victim were strangers, yet
stranger rape constitutes less than 30% of rape convictions. 52 These figures,
in turn, should further shrink the denominator and thus raise the error rate.
With respect to the numerator, many of the exonerations to date have
been based on DNA testing, yet fewer than 20% of violent crimes involve
biological evidence, and in the vast majority of past cases, biological
evidence was not properly collected and held for future testing. 53
Erroneous convictions are hardly “limited to cases in which biological
evidence is available, meaning the number of known exonerations is likely
a serious underestimate of the actual number of exonerations.” 54 To
address concerns such as these, Michael Risinger conducted a study just
three years ago in which he sought to match “apples-to-apples,” comparing
known exonerations in capital rape-murders from the 1980s against a
relevant denominator of cases. Although his study was based on a
relatively small number of exonerations and a series of assumptions, he
concluded that “a true minimum innocence rate for rape-murder[s] from
1982-1989” was at least 3.3% and potentially as high as 5%. 55 In this
respect, Risinger’s estimate was higher, but not wildly so, from a study of
the frequency of wrongful death sentences in which Gross and O’Brien
calculated a 2.3% capital exoneration rate in cases post 1973.56
In the end, we think there are three conclusions to be made from the
research on error rates. First, as Simon suggests, the “true” rate of error in
50
51
52
53
54
55
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Simon, supra note 34.
Gross, supra note 49, at 176.
Simon, supra note 34.
GOULD, supra note 28, at 19.
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Risinger, supra note 35, at 778.
Gross & O’Brien, supra note 4, at 942-47.
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the criminal justice system is “unknowable.” However, the research to date
at least has narrowed the range of estimates. Second, it is essential that
observers consider the method of extrapolation made by researchers, for the
numerator and denominator in such estimates must be comparable. Third,
most of what we know concerns errors in the most serious criminal cases—
rapes and murders, and capital trials at that. Gross points out that errors
may be less common in “light felonies and misdemeanors,”57 as murder
cases are harder to investigate and prove, making errors potentially more
prevalent because police clearance rates are higher. 58 But, it could be just
the opposite, that errors are more common, and more commonly accepted,
in cases where neither police nor prosecutors have as much time, resources,
or pressure to investigate cases thoroughly and in which the lesser stakes of
punishment do not command as many or as zealous advocates to investigate
cases postconviction. It is here—where the debate moves from major
felonies to lesser crimes—that Gross and O’Brien’s admonition is most
relevant and where future research is especially needed.
B. THE HARMS OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

To many observers, the harms of wrongful convictions may seem
obvious. So long as the wrong suspect is behind bars, the public remains at
risk as the actual perpetrator is free to roam the community and prey on
others. Taxpayers must commit resources to cover the imprisonment of an
innocent person. The public may lose trust in the criminal justice system.
And, of course, the innocent defendant loses his freedom while forced to
confront the dangers of imprisonment. But the harms of erroneous
prosecutions and convictions go even deeper, a reality that has been brought
home with a number of studies conducted in the last decade.
Westervelt and Cook, for example, have interviewed individuals
exonerated of capital crimes. 59 As they concluded, the exonerees’
experiences were similar to “life-threatening traumas.” 60 Adrian Grounds,
too, has studied former prisoners, including those exonerated after as many
as nineteen years in prison. 61 Like Westervelt and Cook, he concluded that
“those released following wrongful conviction and imprisonment may have
significant psychiatric and adjustment difficulties of the kind described in
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59
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Id. at 35.
61
Adrian Grounds, Psychological Consequences of Wrongful Conviction and
Imprisonment, 46 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 165 (2004).
58

2010]

ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF GETTING IT WRONG?

837

other groups of people who have suffered chronic psychological trauma.” 62
Although it can be difficult at times to distinguish the needs of exonerees
from those of any former inmate, Westervelt and Cook provide a virtual
laundry list of the needs of exonerees that often go unmet. Tempered with
the joy of their freedom, exonerees often require assistance finding housing,
obtaining medical attention, securing employment and training, acquiring
emergency financial support, managing anger and bitterness, reconnecting
with family and children, addressing drug or alcohol dependency,
negotiating social rejection and stigma, expunging their records, and
seeking a gubernatorial pardon, among other needs.63
Such challenges exist only if the wrongly convicted defendant can
establish his innocence in the first place and earn his release. As University
of Utah law professor Daniel Medwed’s research indicates, however, these
prospects are hardly assured, especially for the innocent defendant who
remains behind bars and must seek release through the parole process. 64 As
Medwed explains, it can be inordinately difficult for a defendant to
convince a parole board that he is “rehabilitated” while maintaining his
innocence when contrition and accepting responsibility for one’s misdeeds
is considered to be a vital part of the rehabilitative process. Insistence on an
admission of guilt before parole is based upon a mistaken belief that the
judicial system is infallible and reveals a law enforcement bias towards
“punishing” those who refuse to confess. 65
Even if an innocent defendant can navigate this arduous process and
secure his release, his prospects of redress are minimal at best. Those
scholars who have studied compensation mechanisms for the exonerated are
effectively unanimous in their conclusion that state compensation
mechanisms are either nonexistent or woefully deficient.66 In 1999, Pace
Law School professor Adele Bernhard surveyed the field, discovering that
“only fourteen states, the District of Columbia and the federal government”
had laws to compensate individuals who had been unjustly convicted and
62
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later exonerated.67 Five years later, she repeated the study, anticipating
that, with “the continuing parade of exonerations . . . local legislatures
[would have enacted] new statutes benefiting the unjustly convicted. . . . I
was wrong,” she reluctantly concluded. 68 If anything, “several states [had]
enacted legislation designed not to assist exonerees in a significant way, but
only to bestow symbolic token support.” 69 Her conclusion is supported by
Chunias and Aufgang’s 2008 finding that state compensation mechanisms
for the exonerated “are excessively restrictive in identifying who will be
compensated, and cap the amount of recovery at artificially low levels.”70
Furthermore, they say, just three states offer meaningful post-release
services, such as reentry planning services. 71 Quite clearly, the researchers
collectively conclude, the harms of wrongful conviction are not adequately
compensated.
C. THE SOURCES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

We doubt that Gross and O’Brien would disagree with the preceding
conclusion. Their claim is more that research into wrongful convictions has
been unable to identify the specific circumstances under which cases will
go awry. As we explain in the following section, the two are correct that
the field lacks discrete “causes” of wrongful convictions, but this is hardly
akin to concluding that we are unaware of the sources of these errors. To
the contrary, there have been numerous studies of wrongful convictions
conducted over the years, many of them identifying the same set of sources.
Much of this research has been conducted by case study, meaning that
researchers have examined one or a few cases of wrongful conviction and,
in narrative form, described the process by which an innocent person was
convicted. An excellent example of this genre is Margaret Edds’s book, An
Expendable Man, 72 which describes the harrowing saga of Earl
Washington, Jr. Mr. Washington, a man of very low intelligence, came
within days of his execution before securing a reprieve and his eventual
exoneration. In a case of a sensational murder, Washington was essentially
talked into a confession by law enforcement officers, who should have
known that he was innocent. What’s more, Mr. Washington’s trial counsel
overlooked key evidence that likely would have established his client’s
innocence at trial. In 2006, Mr. Washington won a multi-million dollar
67
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civil verdict against the sheriff’s deputies whose bad actions had led to his
wrongful conviction. 73
There are many more examples of works like Edds’s case study,
including such well-known titles as Guilty Until Proven Innocent, 74 A
Promise of Justice, 75 The Innocent Man, 76 and Picking Cotton. 77 Indeed,
one of us is responsible for a book like that, chronicling the tragic multiple
wrongful conviction story of the “Norfolk Four.” 78 In that case, four Navy
sailors were coerced and worn down in multiple lengthy interrogations to
confess to a rape-murder that they did not commit, and DNA and other case
evidence conclusively established that another man—who has since
provided a corroborated confession to the crime—acted alone. To date,
each of the four innocent defendants has been released from prison, but
none has been granted a full pardon. 79
In other works, groups of scholars or activists have conducted
aggregated case studies. Under this approach, researchers “create a coding
instrument to classify (demographic, legal, case, outcome) variables found
in [the cases] and then identify and analyze the patterns, correlations, and
outcomes that emerge from the aggregated data.”80 Bedau and Radelet’s
work on wrongful convictions first introduced this method to the field,81 an
approach that has been replicated by others, including both of us. 82
Utilizing pro bono lawyers from major law firms, Innocence Commission
for Virginia (ICVA) researchers conducted separate case studies of eleven
known exonerations in Virginia. Researchers were instructed in the use of
an investigative instrument, and results were chronicled in both a narrative
format and also in a spreadsheet. The Ryan Commission in Illinois used a

73

Editorial, Delayed Justice for Earl Washington, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, May 10, 2006, at

B8.
74

DONALD S. CONNERY, GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT (1977).
DAVID PROTESS & ROB WARDEN, A PROMISE OF JUSTICE: THE EIGHTEEN-YEAR FIGHT
TO SAVE FOUR INNOCENT MEN (1998).
76
JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND INJUSTICE IN A SMALL TOWN
(2006).
77
JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO, RONALD COTTON & ERIN TOMEO, PICKING COTTON:
OUR MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2009).
78
TOM WELLS & RICHARD LEO, THE WRONG GUYS: MURDER, FALSE CONFESSIONS, AND
THE NORFOLK FOUR (2008).
79
Norfolk Four, http://www.norfolkfour.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
80
Richard A. Leo & Jon B. Gould, Studying Wrongful Convictions: Learning from
Social Science, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 19 (2009).
81
Bedau & Radelet, supra note 13.
82
See GOULD, supra note 30; see also Drizin & Leo, supra note 14, at 907; Leo & Ofshe,
supra note 14.
75

840

JON B. GOULD & RICHARD A. LEO

[Vol. 100

similar approach when investigating erroneous convictions in capital
cases. 83
To be sure, neither the ICVA nor the Ryan Commission relied as
stringently on a coding instrument as would be common in social science
research, but interestingly, the results from both commissions mirror those
found in the several other studies of wrongful convictions. 84 This repetition
and replication gives us confidence that, far from anomalies, the sources
identified in these several studies are commonly found in cases of wrongful
conviction. For that matter, the scope of the problem is ever expanding.
When DNA testing first came upon the scene in the early 1990s, the
National Institute of Justice commissioned a study of wrongful convictions.
As mentioned earlier, it found that among rape cases referred to the FBI for
DNA testing, law enforcement officers had been wrong one out of every
four times in naming an initial suspect. 85
When considering the sources of wrongful convictions, it is important
to distinguish, first, between correlation and causation, and second, between
contributing and exclusive sources. Because much of the research to date
has been conducted by case study, we are not able to say that the errors
identified in these cases occur exclusively in wrongful convictions or that
they are the only errors that may lead an innocent suspect to wrongful
imprisonment. For example, the problems of tunnel vision, discussed in a
section below, are likely prevalent in many criminal cases.86 What should
concern us (besides seeking to reduce any common source of error in
criminal prosecutions) is how tunnel vision was overcome in certain cases
to prevent wrongful convictions, but continued unchecked in others to
contribute to mistaken prosecutions and convictions.
For this reason, we think it is better to understand the sources of
wrongful convictions not so much as dichotomous causes—a witness
correctly or incorrectly identified the defendant and the identification
directly led the jury to convict—but as contributing factors in a path
analysis that might have been broken at some point before conviction. We
have written about path analysis in detail before,87 so we do not wish to
replicate that here. However, in sum, path analysis is similar to a decision
tree; one starts with an initial condition regarding a case—say that a crime
has occurred with eyewitnesses—and then traces the possible progression
of that case, through investigation and prosecution, under competing
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scenarios. Among other things, path analysis allows researchers to
understand better where and how intervening forces shape the movement
and outcome of a case through the criminal justice process. For example,
the discovery of biological evidence in the case above could alter its
progression depending upon how convincing the eyewitnesses are, how
wedded detectives are to their initial theory of the case, and how
experienced and diligent the defense attorneys are.
Path analysis takes account of the considerable research on the sources
of wrongful conviction, for, indeed, the very point of a decision tree is to
understand how an erroneous conviction occurred. In this respect, the last
hundred years (and even more important, the prior two decades) have seen
considerable research uncovering the likely sources of wrongful
convictions. Together, this research has identified seven central categories
of sources, including problems involving (1) mistaken eyewitness
identification; (2) false confessions; (3) tunnel vision; (4) informant
testimony; (5) imperfect forensic science; (6) prosecutorial misconduct; and
(7) inadequate defense representation. Apart from these primary sources,
the literature also discusses the potential role of race effects, media effects,
and the failure of postconviction remedies.
1. Mistaken Eyewitness Identification
Nationally, over three-quarters of known wrongful convictions (many
of them in rape cases) are, in part, the result of mistaken eyewitness
Eyewitness misidentification is caused by natural
identifications. 88
psychological errors in human judgment. As Gary Wells and colleagues
have ably noted, stress alters people’s perception of an event. When
confronted with a gun or other weapon during a violent crime, for example,
the victim may focus so heavily on the firearm that he or she cannot take in
and remember well the details of the perpetrator. 89 This problem is
pronounced when the victim and perpetrator are of different races. 90
Victims may believe that they recall the events accurately—the crime
ostensibly “stenciled into their minds”—but research indicates that there is
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little relationship between an eyewitness’s certainty of her identification
and the accuracy of that report.91
Eyewitness identifications can be influenced by the suggestiveness of
the identification process, which “leads eyewitnesses to distort their reports
of the witnessing experience across a broad array of questions.” 92 In
practice, suggestion can enter the identification process in two ways. First,
law enforcement officers or other observers can confirm a witness’s
identification, whether at the time of the identification procedure or at any
point before in-court identification. 93 This can be as subtle as an officer
praising the witness for a “good job” in her identification or as overt as a
detective thanking the witness “for confirming our suspicion.” The
problem with such suggestions is that they can give witnesses false
confidence in their identifications, even if the witnesses are mistaken.
Moreover, witnesses too rarely recognize that a reinforcing comment
inflated their confidence. 94
Law enforcement officers may also employ suggestive identification
procedures that make the suspect stand out from others. For example, in the
case of Marvin Anderson, Anderson’s photograph appeared in color while
the other photographs in the array were black-and-white. 95 A further
example is lineups, in which problems have arisen when the suspect is the
only person presented of a particular height, hair color, or complexion
among a group of six or more. These frailties may lead witnesses to make
“relative judgments,” subtly encouraging them to select the individual in an
identification procedure who looks most like the offender rather than
employing independent judgment to ensure that the individual identified is
the actual perpetrator. 96 Often, someone in a lineup or photo array looks
more like the actual offender than the others present do, and witnesses, in
turn, may be tempted to identify that person. 97 Additionally, any initial
mistaken identification may further reinforce subsequent reports, because
91
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eyewitnesses may confuse or replace their memory of the true perpetrator
with the image of the person who looked most like the offender in the
identification procedure. 98
Given documented problems such as these, U.S. Attorney General
Janet Reno commissioned a group of criminal justice professionals in the
late 1990s to address and recommend guidelines for police identification
procedures. Published by the National Institute of Justice in 1999,99 the
state of New Jersey has adopted these recommendations, and the guidelines
provide the basis for best practices in law enforcement agencies around the
country. 100 Among these best practices, researchers recommend that
witnesses be shown photographs or individuals in a lineup sequentially—
that is, one at a time—rather than simultaneously as a group. 101
Researchers also recommend that witnesses be asked to determine, upon
looking at each photograph or individual, whether the witness recognizes
the perpetrator.
In an analysis of twenty-five studies comparing
simultaneous and sequential identification procedures, scholars have
estimated that sequential procedures can reduce the chances of a mistaken
identification by nearly one-half. 102 Perhaps most important, identification
procedures must be administered “double-blind” so that neither the
eyewitness nor the person administering the lineup knows the identity of the
prime suspect and thus cannot guess about or hint at the correctness of the
identification. In this way, suggestion and feedback effects can be
minimized.
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2. False Confessions
It is difficult for the public to understand why someone would confess
to a crime that the individual did not commit, 103 but research not only
indicates that false confessions occur but also explains how they happen. 104
Several studies of erroneous prosecutions conducted since 1987 have shown
that anywhere from 14% to 25% of the cases reviewed involved false
confessions. 105 According to the national Innocence Project, approximately
two-thirds of the DNA exonerations in homicide cases involved false
confessions. 106 This is consistent with Warden’s finding that approximately
60% of wrongful homicide convictions in Illinois since 1970 involved false
confessions. Moreover, false confessions when introduced into evidence at
trial usually lead to the conviction of the innocent. 107
There is no one cause, logic, or type of false confession. Rather,
police-induced false confessions are the product of a multiple step process
of influence, persuasion, and compliance.
They usually involve
108
Under certain conditions of interrogation, police
psychological coercion.
are more likely to elicit false confessions, and certain types of individuals
are more vulnerable to interrogation pressure and, thus, are more easily
manipulated into giving false confessions. In order to understand why
innocent suspects sometimes make false confessions, first we must look at
the process through which police investigators identify criminal suspects
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and how police interrogation works as a psychological process, both in the
pre-admission and post-admission stages of interrogation.
Three errors occur in sequence when police elicit a false confession
that leads to a wrongful conviction. The first error occurs when detectives
mistakenly classify an innocent person as guilty. As Davis and Leo point
out, “once specific suspects are targeted, police interviews and
interrogations are thereafter guided by the presumption of guilt.” 109
Whether to interrogate is arguably the most critical decision point in the
investigative process.
Police only elicit false confessions if they
erroneously interrogate innocent people. If all the suspects the police
interrogated were, in fact, guilty, they would never elicit false confessions
from the innocent. Misclassifying innocent suspects is thus both the first
and the most consequential error police interrogators make.
Although many cognitive errors lead police to mistakenly classify an
innocent person as a guilty suspect, perhaps the most common errors are the
product of their investigative training. Police officers in the United States
are erroneously taught that they can learn to become human lie detectors,
able to distinguish truth from deception at extraordinarily high rates of
accuracy. 110 For example, detectives are taught that the following behaviors
are symptomatic of deceptive, and thus guilty, suspects: averting one’s
gaze, slouching, shifting body posture, touching one’s nose, adjusting or
cleaning one’s glasses, chewing one’s fingernails, and stroking the back of
one’s head. Suspects who are guarded, uncooperative, and offer broad
denials and qualified responses are also believed to be lying and thus guilty.
However, across a variety of contexts, social science studies have
repeatedly shown that individuals are highly prone to error in their
judgments about whether an individual is lying or telling the truth and, thus,
are poor human lie detectors. Studies show that most people accurately
make these types of judgments at rates no better than the flip of a coin.111
Moreover, studies have suggested that police interrogators themselves
cannot accurately distinguish between truthful and false denials of guilt at
levels greater than chance but, instead, routinely make erroneous judgments
when trying to separate the innocent from the guilty. 112
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Once detectives misclassify an innocent person as a guilty suspect, the
next step is to subject him to an accusatorial interrogation. Obtaining a
confession becomes especially important when there is little or no other
evidence against the suspect—especially in high-profile cases in which
police detectives are under great pressure to solve the crime 113—and
typically no credible evidence exists against an innocent suspect who police
erroneously believe is guilty. Perhaps not surprisingly, the vast majority of
documented false confession cases occur in homicides and high profile
cases. 114
The primary cause of police-induced false confessions is the use of
psychologically coercive police interrogation methods. 115 These include
methods that were once identified with the old “third degree,” such as
deprivation (of food, sleep, water, or access to bathroom facilities, for
example), incommunicado interrogation, and extreme induced exhaustion
and fatigue. Since the 1940s, however, these techniques have become rare
in domestic police interrogations.
Instead, when today’s police
interrogators employ psychologically coercive techniques, they usually
consist of implicit or explicit promises of leniency and implicit or explicit
threats of harsher treatment in combination with other interrogation
techniques such as accusation, repetition, attacks on denials, and false
evidence ploys. 116 Even in the absence of promises of leniency or threats of
harm, police interrogation may become psychologically coercive if it leads
the interrogated suspect to perceive that he has no choice but to comply
with the demands of his interrogators. Contemporary psychological
interrogation can easily become coercive for multiple reasons. The
custodial environment and physical confinement are intended to isolate and
disempower the suspect. Interrogation also is designed to be stressful and
unpleasant, and of course, the more intensely it proceeds and the longer it
lasts, the more stressful and unpleasant it will become. Interrogation
techniques are meant to cause the suspect to perceive that his guilt has been
established with complete certainty, that therefore no one will believe his
denials of guilt or assertions of innocence, and that he will only make his
situation (and the ultimate outcome of the case against him) much worse if
he continues to deny the detectives’ accusations. The suspect may comply
with the detectives’ wishes because he is fatigued, worn down, or simply
Fong, “I’m Innocent!” Effects of Training on Judgments of Truth and Deception in the
Interrogation Room, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 499, 500-01 (1999).
113
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115
See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 108, at 214-20; see also LEO supra note 104, at 229-31.
116
LEO, supra note 104, at 155-62.
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sees no other way to escape an intolerably stressful experience. Commonly,
suspects who falsely confess believe that they will only be able to leave if
they do what the detectives say. Other suspects comply because they are
led to believe that it is the only way to avoid a feared outcome (not being
able to see their young children again or going to prison for life instead of
just a few years). When a suspect perceives that he has no choice but to
comply, his confession is coerced and involuntary. 117
Although psychological coercion is the primary cause of policeinduced false confessions, individuals differ in their ability to withstand
interrogation pressure and, therefore, in their vulnerability to giving false
confessions. 118 Individuals who are highly suggestible or compliant are
more likely to confess falsely. So too are the developmentally disabled,
cognitively impaired, juveniles, and the mentally ill—all of whom tend to
be unusually suggestible and compliant. The developmentally disabled are
more likely to confess falsely for a variety of reasons. 119 Youth is also a
117

Ofshe & Leo, supra note 108, at 214-20; see also LEO, supra note 104, at 229-31.
GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A
HANDBOOK 332-59 (2003).
119
This is due to their subnormal intellectual functioning, resulting in low intelligence, a
short attention span, poor memory, and poor conceptual and communication skills. They do
not always understand statements made to them or the implications of the answers they give.
Often, these people lack the ability to think in a causal way about the consequences of their
actions. Their limited intellectual intelligence translates into a limited social intelligence as
well, and consequently they do not always fully comprehend the context or complexity of
certain social interactions or situations. This is especially relevant when in a particularly
adversarial situation such as a police interrogation. Under interrogation, they are not likely
to understand that the police detective who appears to be friendly is really their adversary or
to comprehend the long-term consequences of making an incriminating statement. The
developmentally disabled are highly suggestible and easy to manipulate. They also lack selfconfidence, possess poor problem-solving abilities, and have tendencies to mask or disguise
their cognitive deficits. Exacerbating the problem, the developmentally disabled tend to look
to others—particularly authority figures—for appropriate cues to behavior. It is therefore
easy to get them to agree with and repeat back false or misleading statements, even
incriminating ones. See LEO supra note 104, at 231-34.
Additionally—as many researchers have noted—the developmentally disabled are eager
to please. They are prone to being acquiescent due to their high need for approval. They
compensate for their cognitive disability by learning to submit to the demands of others,
even more so from authority figures. Because of this desire to please, they are easily
influenced and led to comply in situations of conflict. Some observers refer to this as
“biased responding,” where the developmentally disabled answer affirmatively when they
perceive a response to be desirable and negatively when they perceive it to be undesirable.
They will answer the person questioning them with what they believe he or she wants to
hear. Similarly, the developmentally disabled exhibit the “cheating to lose” syndrome: they
eagerly assume blame or knowingly provide incorrect answers in order to please and seek
the approval of an authority figure. It is easy to see how their compliance and
submissiveness can lead the developmentally disabled to make false confessions during
police interrogations. Id.
118
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significant risk factor for police-induced false confessions. 120 Finally,
people with mental illness are also disproportionately likely to falsely
confess, 121 especially in response to accusatorial police pressure.122
The use of psychologically coercive police methods (and how they
interact with an individual’s personality) usually explains how and why
interrogation succeeds in moving an innocent suspect from denial to
admission. But a confession consists not only of an “I did it” statement but
Because of their cognitive disabilities and learned coping behaviors, the smallest amount
of stress may overwhelm the developmentally disabled. They simply lack the psychological
ability to withstand the level of pressure, distress, and anxiety that normal individuals can.
As a result, they tend to avoid conflict, and situations that produce ordinary levels of stress—
which is far below that felt in an accusatorial police interrogation—are overwhelming to
them. They are therefore less likely to resist the pressures of confrontational police
questioning and more likely to comply with the demands of their accusers, even if this
results in making a false confession. The breaking point at which they are willing to falsely
tell a detective what he wants to hear in order to escape an aversive interrogation is often
much lower than that for a mentally normal individual, especially in prolonged
interrogations. In recent years, there have been numerous documented cases of false
confessions from the developmentally disabled. Id.
120
Young children and adolescents also share many of the character traits that are
present in the developmentally disabled. Juveniles especially are highly compliant to
authoritative figures and tend to be immature, naïve, acquiescent, and eager to please. Thus,
they are predisposed to be submissive when questioned by police. Such youth are also
highly suggestible and, like the developmentally disabled, are easily pressured and
persuaded to make false incriminating statements, especially when questioned by police.
They lack the cognitive capacity to fully grasp the gravity of a police interrogation and
cannot comprehend the long-term consequences of their actions. Juveniles, like the
developmentally disabled, also have limited language skills, memory, attention span, and
information-processing abilities compared to normal adults and are less capable of
withstanding interpersonal stress, and thus more likely to perceive aversive interrogation as
intolerable. See id.
121
Allison D. Redlich, Mental Illness, Police Interrogations, and the Potential for False
Confession, 55 LAW & PSYCHIATRY 19 (2004).
122
The mentally ill possess a range of psychiatric symptoms that make them more likely
to agree with, suggest, or confabulate false and misleading information to detectives during
police interrogations. Such symptoms include faulty reality monitoring, proneness to
feelings of guilt, distorted perceptions and beliefs, an inability to distinguish fact from
fantasy, heightened anxiety, mood disturbances, and a lack of self-control. Additionally, the
mentally ill may suffer from deficits in executive functioning, attention, and memory, may
become easily confused, and may lack social skills such as assertiveness. These traits
increase the risk of falsely confessing. While the mentally ill are likely to make voluntary
false confessions, they also may be easily coerced into making compliant ones. As Salas
points out, “[m]ental illness makes people suggestible and susceptible to the slightest form of
pressure; coercion can take place much more easily, and in situations that a ‘normal’ person
might not find coercive.” Claudio Salas, Note, The Case For Excluding the Criminal
Confessions of the Mentally Ill, 16 YALE J.L. & HUM. 243, 264 (2004). Thus, “the mentally
ill are especially vulnerable either to giving false confessions or to misunderstanding the
context of their confessions, thus making statements against their own best interests that an
average criminal suspect would not make.” Id. at 274.
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also of a subsequent narrative—what researchers have referred to as the
post-admission narrative 123—that contextualizes and attempts to explain the
“I did it” statement, transforming the admission into a confession. A
detailed post-admission narrative is what makes the story appear to be a
compelling account of the suspect’s guilt. The content and structure of a
suspect’s post-admission narrative goes a long way toward explaining why
confessions are treated as such powerful evidence of guilt and sometimes
lead to the wrongful conviction of the innocent. 124
Police detectives use the post-admission phase of interrogation to
influence, shape, and sometimes even script the suspect’s narrative. The
detective’s ultimate objective is to elicit a persuasive account of what
happened that successfully incriminates the suspect and leads to his
conviction. For example, in false confession cases interrogators have
sometimes invented, suggested, or elicited an account of the suspect’s
motivation. They often use scenario-based inducements as a method of
attributing a minimizing motive to the suspect—which the suspect agrees to
and then repeats back, even if it is completely inaccurate, because he comes
to believe that it will reduce his culpability. Police interrogators will also
encourage suspects to attribute their decision to confess to an act of
conscience, to express remorse about committing the crime, and to provide
vivid scene details that appear to corroborate the suspect’s guilty
knowledge and thus confirm his culpability. In addition, interrogators will
try to make the admission appear to be voluntarily given, portraying the
suspect as the agent of his own confession and themselves merely as its
passive recipients. 125
Police detectives help create false confessions in the post-admission
narrative phase of interrogation by pressuring the suspect to accept a
particular account and suggesting crime facts to him, thereby contaminating
the suspect’s post-admission narrative. Unless the suspect has learned the
crime scene facts from the media, community gossip, or overheard
conversations, an innocent person will not know either the mundane or the
dramatic details of the crime. 126 Absent such contamination, the innocent
suspect’s post-admission narrative should therefore be replete with errors
when responding to questions for which the answers cannot easily be
guessed by chance. Unless, of course, the answers are implied, suggested,
or explicitly provided to the suspect—which, unfortunately, does occur in

123
124
125
126

Leo & Ofshe, supra note 14, at 496.
LEO, supra note 104, at 165-94.
See id.
Leo & Ofshe, supra note 14, at 438-40.
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many false confession cases. 127 When an interrogation is recorded, it may
be possible to trace, step by step, how and when the interrogator implied or
suggested the correct answers for the suspect to incorporate into his postadmission narrative. However, when the interrogation is not recorded—and
the interrogations preceding virtually all of the documented false confession
cases have not been recorded—then there may be no objective way to prove
the interrogator contaminated the suspect’s post-admission narrative. The
contamination of the suspect’s post-admission narrative is thus the third
mistake in the trilogy of police errors that, cumulatively, lead to the
elicitation and construction of a suspect’s false confession.
Although police training is important in identifying and thus avoiding
an erroneous confession, research indicates that electronically recording
interrogations can minimize the likelihood that a false confession will lead
to a wrongful conviction. 128 Not only are law enforcement officers more
careful in interrogating suspects when they know a jury may view the
proceedings—abstaining from threats, punishment, or undue coaching—
jurors also can evaluate the circumstances of the interrogation to determine
the accuracy of the witness’s statements. 129 In the case of Earl Washington,
Jr., for example, a videotape would have shown officers holding up a key
piece of evidence for Washington to describe rather than creating the
impression at trial that Washington had freely described a secret piece of
evidence known only to the perpetrator. For that matter, electronic
recording presents advantages for law enforcement officers who conduct
proper interrogations. Videotaped evidence can be quite compelling for
jurors, and there is reason to believe that suspects are more likely to plead
guilty to a crime when a properly administered interrogation shows them
confessing to the crime. Such evidence also may stave off meritless civil
suits when judges and jurors can see for themselves how officers behaved
in the interrogation room. It is no wonder that surveys of officers using
videotape find that many “enthusiastically support this practice.”130

127
See Richard Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal
Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479; see also Brandon Garrett,
The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051 (2010).
128
See LEO, supra note 104, at 291-305; see also Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic
Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1127, 1128-30 (2005).
129
Of course, the entire interrogation procedure must be recorded so that officers are not
just “cherry-picking” those examples most helpful to their cause.
130
Sullivan, supra note 128, at 1128.
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3. Tunnel Vision
Like any of us, police officers and prosecutors are susceptible to tunnel
vision. That is, the more law enforcement practitioners become convinced
of a conclusion—in this case, a suspect’s guilt—the less likely they are to
consider alternative scenarios that conflict with this conclusion. As Findley
and Scott explain more comprehensively, when criminal justice
professionals “focus on a suspect, select and filter the evidence that will
‘build a case’ for conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence that
points away from guilt,” 131 they are at risk of “locking on” to the wrong
suspect and inadvertently leading to his continued prosecution and
conviction.
Tunnel vision can occur at any point in the criminal justice process. 132
An officer may be so convinced of an eyewitness’s identification that he
ignores other case facts that point away from the suspect’s guilt; a forensic
scientist may conduct a hair comparison and see such a close match
between that of the perpetrator and a suspect that he overlooks fingerprint
analysis that isn’t as compelling; a prosecutor may be so satisfied with a
suspect’s confession that he discounts forensic evidence that inculpates
others; or a defense lawyer may consider the prosecution’s case so airtight
that he doesn’t bother to look deeper into the government’s files. Any of
these possibilities may explain why innocent individuals are named as
suspects and prosecuted all the way to a conviction. These are not just
theoretical possibilities; the many case studies of wrongful convictions
show these errors are real and have grievous consequences.133
4. Informant Testimony
Watch a “B movie” late at night and you stand a good chance of seeing
the proverbial scene in a courtroom drama in which a police informant takes
the stand to inculpate the defendant in the crime. “The defendant whispered
to me over breakfast that he had committed the crime and hidden the
money,” the police “snitch” may utter. Although such scenes may make for
mild entertainment, the reality is that a number of wrongful convictions
have turned on the testimony of police informants who themselves lied for
personal gain. As scholars note, informants are often rewarded without

131

Keith Findley & Michael Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292.
132
See Myrna Raeder, What Does Innocence Have to Do with It?: A Commentary on
Wrongful Convictions and Rationality, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1315.
133
See GOULD, supra note 28.
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regard to the accuracy and reliability of their information,134 with as many
as one-fifth of wrongful conviction cases based on snitches that lied.135 A
classic case is that of Jeffrey Cox in Virginia. Cox’s conviction for
abduction and murder was made largely on the testimony of two witnesses,
whose prior felony convictions and pending charges were not disclosed to
the defense. Each of these facts would have undermined the credibility of
the witnesses, but instead of sharing this information with the defense, the
prosecution vouched for the veracity of both witnesses in its closing
argument. 136 As a federal appellate judge has said of informant testimony,
the government relies too heavily on witnesses who are “rewarded
criminals,” which compromises both the accuracy and the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system. “Because the government decides whether and
when to use such witnesses, and what, if anything, to give them for their
service, the government . . . can either contribute to or eliminate the
problem,” the judge notes. 137
5. Forensic Science
Given the rise and wide acceptance of DNA testing, it is possible to
forget that, for decades, law enforcement had to rely on much less accurate
forensic methods. Perhaps the most famous practice is fingerprinting, a
method so common that applicants for many sensitive jobs have had to
submit to a series of fingerprints. But evidence is now mounting about the
problems with fingerprinting analysis 138—which include a lack of validity
testing and an absence of validated standards for declaring a match 139—and
in a recent Maryland case a trial judge ruled that latent fingerprint
identification is not sufficiently reliable to be admissible into evidence.140
The substance behind this conclusion was bolstered by a recent National
134

See Clifford Zimmerman, From the Jailhouse to the Courthouse: The Role of
Informants in Wrongful Convictions, in WRONGLY CONVICTED, supra note 15, at 72.
135
See Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful
Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107 (2006).
136
GOULD, supra note 28, at 96.
137
Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses,
47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381, 1382 (1996).
138
See James E. Starrs, There’s Something About Novel Scientific Evidence, 28 SW. U. L.
REV. 417 (1999); see also SIMON COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING
AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (2003).
139
Jennifer Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a
Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW, PROB. & RISK 127, 129 (2008).
140
In Maryland v. Rose, No. K06-0545, mem. op. at 31 (Balt. County Cir. Ct. Oct. 19,
2007), the trial court held that the ACE-V method of latent fingerprint identification was “a
subjective, untested, unverifiable identification procedure that purports to be infallible”. See
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A
PATH FORWARD 105 n.78 (2009).
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Research Council report on forensic evidence that echoed Haber and
Haber’s conclusion 141 that “we have reviewed the available scientific
evidence of the validity of the ACE-V method [of latent fingerprint
identification] and found none.” 142
Fingerprint analysis is hardly the most questionable forensic method
employed. More troubling is hair comparison analysis, in which hairs
found at a crime scene are compared under a microscope to those of a
possible suspect. Although hair comparison analysis has passed the Frye 143
and Daubert standards in many courts and has been admitted into evidence,
more recent research raises considerable doubts about its accuracy. 144 For
example, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Laboratory
Proficiency Testing Program, involving over 235 crime laboratories
throughout the United States, found hair comparison analysis to be the
weakest of all forensic laboratory techniques tested, with error rates as high
as 67% on individual samples, and the majority of laboratories reaching
incorrect results on four out of five hair samples analyzed. Another study
found that hair comparison error rates dropped from 30% to 4% when
common hair comparison methods, which compare a questioned hair to the
hair samples of a suspect, were changed to a “lineup” method, in which
examiners compare a hair sample from the crime scene to samples from five
potential suspects.145
Another potentially problematic test has been serology analysis, which
seeks to establish the probability that a perpetrator and suspect share the
same blood type. By contrast to DNA testing, serology analysis does not
specifically identify suspects, but jurors may not appreciate this fact,
hearing testimony of similar blood types as proof of identity “with as much
definitiveness as science can muster.” 146 Of course, that is no longer the
case.
DNA testing has helped to uncover the frailties of forensic methods
used previously. This said, DNA is not a panacea. There is always the
141
Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, Scientific Validation of Fingerprint Evidence
Under Daubert, 7 LAW, PROB. & RISK 87 (2008).
142
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 140, at 136-45.
143
See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that scientific
evidence is admissible if the technique is generally accepted as reliable in the relevant
scientific community).
144
See Larry S. Miller, Procedural Bias in Forensic Science Examinations of Human
Hair, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 157 (1987); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Hair
Analysis: The Case Against the Underemployment of Scientific Evidence, 39 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 41 (1982).
145
GOULD, supra note 28, at 176.
146
Andre A. Moenssens, Foreword, Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some
Words of Caution, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 13 (1993).
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small probability that the results will be inaccurate, but more importantly,
few crime scenes have sufficient, specific biological evidence for DNA
analysis. A robber may never touch a victim nor shed hairs or other
biological markers in a spot specific to himself.147 As a result, law
enforcement must usually rely on other evidence, including different forms
of forensic analysis that carry with them greater risks of inaccuracy.
Apart from the inherent weaknesses of various forms of forensic
evidence, there have been several shocking examples of improper, indeed
shoddy, laboratory practices and forensic testimony that have led to the
conviction of innocent defendants.148 The problem is so serious that the
National Research Council concluded in 2009 that “the forensic science
system [in the United States is] fragmented and the quality of practice
uneven. . . . These shortcomings pose a threat to the quality and credibility
of forensic science practice and its service to the justice system.” 149
6. Prosecutorial Misconduct
For the most part, American prosecutors conduct themselves ethically,
seeking to mete out justice even if it means dismissing charges against a
defendant whose criminality they suspect but cannot establish. Still,
prosecutors may engage in overly suggestive witness coaching, 150 offer
inappropriate and incendiary closing arguments, 151 or fail to disclose critical
evidence to the defense, all of which may raise the prospect of a wrongful
conviction. In research on wrongful convictions, the most commonly
established transgression is the prosecution’s failure to turn over
exculpatory evidence.
Sometimes police officers do not provide
prosecutors with this evidence in order to make it available to the defense,

147
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Cases, ABA J., Aug. 19, 2010.
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or prosecutors may not be aware that they have such information in their
files. In other cases, though, the misdeeds are intentional.
Consider the case of Edward Honaker, a man convicted for rape on the
basis of testimony from the victim and her boyfriend. The prosecution
never turned over an officer’s report that the victim had not been “allowed
to clearly see the [perpetrator] during the entire sequence of events,” nor,
more incredulously, did it reveal that the victim and her boyfriend were
hypnotized four months after the crime, at which time they first identified
Honaker’s photo as that of the rapist. 152 Instead, the prosecution’s
witnesses were permitted to testify at trial, identifying Honaker, without the
defense aware that there were good grounds to doubt any identification. In
cases like these, it is easy to see how the prosecution’s failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence that is material 153 can lead to a wrongful conviction.
7. Inadequate Defense Representation
Even if prosecutors fail in their duties, we expect a suspect’s attorney
to zealously investigate and defend his case. As Professor Bernhard
explains, “[i]t [is] the defense counsel’s responsibility to protect [the
innocent] from the mistakes of others: from witnesses’ misidentifications,
police officers’ rush to judgment, and prosecution’s reluctance to reveal
potentially exculpatory material.”154 Yet, as a Columbia University study
of capital appeals has found, ineffective defense lawyering was the biggest
contributing factor to the wrongful conviction or death sentence of criminal
defendants in capital cases over a twenty-three-year period. 155 The central
reason behind ineffective representation is inadequate funding, an absence
of quality control, and a lack of motivation. 156 The attorney may be so
rushed that he fails to communicate with his client or communicates “in a
dismissive, callous or hurried manner.” 157 He may make perfunctory
attempts at discovery, if any; engage in a narrow or shallow investigation;
neglect to retain needed experts or test physical evidence; fail to prepare for
trial; or offer “weak trial advocacy and superficial or tentative cross-
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examination.” 158 The result is a cascade of errors that dilutes or even
destroys the barrier provided by an effective advocate between an innocent
defendant and a wrongful conviction.
8. Interrelated Themes
Although the factors just discussed are those that appear most often in
research on the sources of wrongful conviction, three other issues merit
mention for, if not definitive sources, they serve as either background
influences or interrelated factors. These include questions of race,
inadequate postconviction remedies, and the role of the media. Any student
of the criminal justice system recognizes that there are serious race effects
in the identification, prosecution, and sentencing of criminal suspects.
Racial and ethnic minorities are disproportionately more likely than whites
to be stopped and arrested by the police,159 and once convicted, they are
also more likely to receive longer prison terms than do whites. 160 They are
also more likely to be subject to some of the sources that lead to wrongful
convictions. 161 The clearest example is mistaken eyewitness identification,
in which the research indicates that errors are more likely when the victim
and perpetrator are of different races. In the cases studied, the most
common pattern of error is when a white victim is raped by an AfricanAmerican or Hispanic man and unintentionally identifies an innocent
person as the perpetrator. Another area of concern is jury decision-making;
in a number of cases, all-white juries have erroneously convicted AfricanAmerican men based on questionable evidence and with scant
deliberation. 162 To be sure, these problems are hardly limited to cases of
known exonerations—and, indeed, procedural justice is threatened when the
trier of fact allows racial assumptions or prejudice to enter into the calculus
of decision. But when jurors (and judges) operate on either known or even
unconscious biases to convict the innocent, the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system is threatened.
Once convicted, innocent defendants often find it extremely arduous to
establish their blamelessness. Legal doctrine makes such showings difficult
to prove, for in throwing out a conviction and, in some cases, ordering a
158
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new trial, the courts must be persuaded that no reasonable juror (or judge in
a bench trial) could have concluded that the defendant was guilty. 163 The
defendant’s task is even more onerous when states maintain procedures, as
Virginia did for decades, that a motion for new trial based on exculpating
evidence had to be filed within twenty-one days of the order of conviction.
As any criminal trial lawyer knows, it is rare to the point of unknown for
important, new evidence to come to light within three weeks of sentencing.
Virginia has now replaced its twenty-one-day rule with a Writ of
Actual Innocence, 164 a procedural outlet that other states are considering.
But a promising law on the books does not necessarily translate to actual
exonerations if the courts that administer the law are systematically
skeptical of non-biological evidence. Indeed, it is hardly coincidental that
the vast majority of exonerations were achieved not because the courts
stepped in and ordered a new trial or habeas corpus relief, but because
governors or other political leaders, including parole boards, intervened. In
some cases, they had the active support of prosecutors, who admirably
came forward to rectify what they believed had been a miscarriage of
justice. But as Daniel Medwed’s research also has shown, the institutional
culture of some prosecutors’ offices creates an environment in which
“resistance to post-conviction innocence claims is an accepted and
pervasive cultural norm” that helps prosecutors avoid being seen as soft on
crime. 165 In such cases, an innocent but convicted defendant faces even
greater obstacles in rectifying the error done to him.
Finally, it is important to note the role of the media in both creating the
conditions for wrongful convictions and investigating doubtful cases
postconviction to help defendants prove their innocence. One of the
background conditions that raises the possibility of a wrongful conviction is
the heinousness of the underlying crime. Brutal rapes and murders,
multiple murders, and crimes against children particularly inflame the
sensibilities of the public and understandably lead to calls to catch and
punish the criminal as quickly as possible. When these crimes also generate
press coverage—especially the sensational coverage of televised media—
there arises a continuous drumbeat of pressure for authorities to “do
something” to apprehend a suspect. Under these circumstances, research
shows, police officers and prosecutors may feel rushed to complete their
163
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investigations and, resultantly, may fall prey to tunnel vision that has them
pursuing the wrong suspect.
At the same time, the media, or more specifically, print reporters, have
been instrumental in establishing the innocence of some defendants who
otherwise would have spent years in prison if not faced the prospect of
execution.
Perhaps the most famous are former journalists, now
Northwestern University professors, David Protess and Robert Warden,
whose investigations with their students helped to uncover errors in several
Illinois cases. They were aided by Ken Armstrong, Steve Mills, and
Maurice Possley, all writers for the Chicago Tribune, whose “exposé” on
erroneous capital convictions in Illinois was instrumental in convincing
then-Governor George Ryan to commute the sentences of Illinois’s death
row population and to issue a moratorium on further capital prosecutions
until additional reforms could be considered. Warden has written about this
process and the power that investigative journalism can have in raising
awareness of wrongful convictions and building the constituency for
reform. 166 As his Center on Wrongful Convictions 167 explains,
[i]t wasn’t that Americans didn’t care that innocent men and women were rotting in
prison or on death row, but rather that most people simply couldn’t accept the fact that
such miscarriages of justice could happen on a large scale. When the public and the
legal profession finally did come to recognize the alarming scope of the problem, it
168
turned out that there was a great deal of interest.

IV. IMPROVING THE RESEARCH
We agree with Gross and O’Brien on the need to improve the research
conducted on wrongful convictions, for very few of the studies to date have
employed controls. Certainly, we know that several systemic problems are
associated with wrongful convictions, but is it possible that those failings
are found in criminal prosecutions as a whole, regardless of whether the
defendant is innocent? Put another way, might a case of rightful conviction
see the same kinds of failures as a wrongful conviction? Or, conversely, is
it possible that a defendant could be rightly acquitted even when facing
such problems as an erroneous identification or incomplete forensic
evidence? In a perfect world of research, we would clamor for studies that
employ an effective control group, but here that is difficult to obtain.
Unlike in medical research, a suspect may not be randomly assigned to a
166
See Rob Warden, The Revolutionary Role of Journalism in Identifying and Rectifying
Wrongful Convictions, 70 UMKC L. REV. 803 (2003).
167
Warden serves as executive director of Northwestern University’s Center on
Wrongful Convictions.
168
About Us, Center on Wrongful Convictions, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
wrongfulconvictions/aboutus/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2010).
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treatment group at the start of a criminal case. Some of this is logistical,169
but more importantly, our system of constitutional rights would not permit
it. 170
Where controls have been employed, researchers generally have
compared cases of wrongful conviction with those of rightful conviction or
have examined exonerations against cases of presumed innocence in which
the defendant was executed. In the first set of comparisons, researchers
effectively have asked, why does the criminal justice system work properly
in some cases (the rightful convictions) but not in others (the wrongful
convictions)? In others, they presume that the criminal justice system has
failed both sets of defendants (as all were wrongly convicted) but then ask
why the system was able to correct the errors in some cases (those who
were released) but not in others (cases in which a presumably innocent
defendant was executed).
A classic example of the first matched comparison study is Talia
Harmon’s 2001 article in Justice Quarterly. 171 Harmon assembled a data
set of seventy-six cases from 1970 to 1998 in which capital inmates were
released from death row because of “doubts about their guilt” 172 and
compared them to a random sample of matched inmates who were
convicted at trial and executed for their crimes. Using logistic regression,
Harmon identified several independent variables that distinguished the two
sets of cases. In her study, capital inmates were more likely to be released
if new evidence had been discovered, if the defense alleged perjury by
prosecution witnesses, if the appeal was handled by a private lawyer or one
from a resource center, or if fewer forms of evidence had been introduced at
trial.
Harmon’s study is interesting on several levels. First, it occupies a
hybrid position between predicting which sources may cause a wrongful
conviction in capital cases and which factors will lead the system to correct
its errors. For example, the amount of evidence introduced at trial could
explain why a wrongful conviction occurred (some trial attorneys
presumably not doing their job) and why an appellate court would grant a
defendant’s release from death row (the lawyer’s ineffective assistance
justifying a successful appeal). Interestingly, Harmon’s work showed that
169

It would be nearly impossible to predict at the start of a case which defendants would
be subject to, say, junk science, whereas others would be provided complete and accurate
forensic results.
170
Indeed, the Sixth Amendment would prohibit any effort to assign one group of
defendants to capable lawyers and another group to incompetent counsel.
171
Talia Roitberg Harmon, Predictors of Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 18
JUST. Q. 949 (2001).
172
Id. at 957.
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the type of lawyer at trial (public defender or privately retained) did not
predict whether a defendant would be released on appeal, but the data
indicated that type of appellate lawyer—and thus, either quality or available
resources 173—affected the chance of release.
The other curiosity about Harmon’s work is that she does not fully
define whether the defendants released from death row were factually
innocent. In pulling from Radelet and colleagues’ 1996 work, 174 she notes
that there were “doubts” about the defendants’ guilt.175 To be sure, each of
the defendants was released from death row, but it’s not the case that each
defendant was exonerated and released from prison. Thus, to some extent,
Harmon’s study tells us more about when and why the criminal justice
system will grant capital appeals than it does about the sources of wrongful
convictions. Still, it’s interesting that several of her findings dovetail
closely with prior case studies on wrongful convictions. In her list of
statistically significant predictors, one finds variables associated with
prosecutorial misconduct and snitch testimony as well as ineffective
defense representation.
Harmon later teamed up with criminologist William Lofquist to
compare matched sets of capital defendants that the researchers claimed
were innocent. 176 In one set, the defendants had been released from prison;
in the other, the defendants had been executed. Thus, Harmon and Lofquist
sought to examine why the criminal justice system worked—or did not—in
freeing the wrongly convicted from death row. Their results mirrored many
of Harmon’s findings in her earlier study, concluding that defendants who
had a private or resource center lawyer representing them at trial (as
opposed to a public defender), whose prosecutions relied on fewer forms of
evidence at trial, who raised allegations of perjury on appeal, who did not
have a prior felony record, or whose case involved an African-American
defendant and a white victim were significantly more likely to be formally
exonerated.

173
In identifying private counsel or resource center lawyers as the most successful on
appeal, Harmon’s work uncovers a belief widely presumed among the defense community.
Lawyers from large firms who handle direct or habeas corpus appeals on a pro bono basis
are often able to marshal substantial talent and resources for the defense. Similarly, lawyers
from capital resource centers have more specialized training and experience than other
attorneys who may take these cases. None of this should be seen as denigrating the work of
other capital appellate attorneys; rather it is the regular experience and available resources of
other lawyers that may give them a greater leg-up in appellate work.
174
Radelet, Lofquist & Bedau, supra note 17.
175
Harmon, supra note 171, at 957.
176
Talia Roitberg Harmon & William S. Lofquist, Too Late for Luck: A Comparison of
Post-Furman Exonerations and Executions of the Innocent, 51 CRIME & DELINQ. 498 (2005).
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Whereas Harmon and Lofquist sought to compare the innocentexonerated to the innocent-executed, Gross and O’Brien have compared the
innocent-exonerated to the guilty-executed. 177 In a sense, they were asking
different questions. Harmon and Lofquist were interested in why the
criminal justice system failed the innocent after a capital conviction. Gross
and O’Brien, by contrast, provided a more descriptive analysis of capital
litigation, essentially asking what is unique about capital cases that leads to
exoneration in some cases and execution in others. 178 Admittedly, any
wrongful conviction is, by definition, a failure, but at least postconviction
exoneration avoids the most tragic of possibilities—the execution of an
innocent person.
Gross and O’Brien’s analysis relied on chi-square tests rather than
regression equations, but their results offer modest predictors for why
capital cases may end in exoneration over execution. As they note, capital
defendants who were exonerated were significantly less likely to be
reported as mentally ill, more likely to have been tried for crimes that
involved two or fewer victims or child victims, less likely to have
confessed, more likely to have claimed innocence at trial, and more likely to
have had an extensive criminal record (especially violent felonies) than
those who were executed. 179
Gross and O’Brien correctly note the limitations of studying wrongful
convictions this way. 180 By relying on official exonerations to define the
set of wrongful convictions, they leave out cases in which a defendant is
actually innocent but cannot reach the heightened bar of proof
postconviction. 181 Furthermore, they concentrate our attention on capital
rape/murder, in which DNA evidence is more likely to be found than in
most other types of cases and can offer better “objective” evidence of
innocence or guilt. Indeed, rather than explaining why some defendants are
wrongly convicted, research like that of Gross and O’Brien may tell us
177

Gross & O’Brien, supra note 4.
Of course, it is possible that some of the executed defendants were, in fact, innocent
and should have been exonerated. But, as Gross and O’Brien note, “[f]or those who were
put to death, the legal system concluded that there was no evidence of innocence sufficient to
stop the executions. For those who were exonerated, the system determined there was
sufficient evidence of innocence to require that the defendants be cleared and released.” Id.
at 948.
179
Id. at 952-57.
180
As they contend, “[a]lmost everything that we do know [about wrongful convictions]
is based on information about exonerations, and it is clear that exonerations are highly
unrepresentative of wrongful convictions in general.” Id. at 958.
181
Whereas the state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, a convicted
defendant must establish that no reasonable person would believe him guilty in
postconviction proceedings. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538-40 (2006).
178
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more about how some capital defendants are able to secure postconviction
release.
Even accepting these limitations, we would hardly doubt the
significance of their work. To a large extent, their research helps to explain
why some capital cases “go right” in the system while others fail. 182
Moreover, their work needs to be read in tandem with the findings from
several other studies of wrongful convictions. Although Gross and
O’Brien’s study presents at least one seeming anomaly (exonerations were
less likely among those considered mentally ill), their findings confirm and
add more detail to the picture of wrongful convictions that has emerged
from prior research. Examining their findings as a whole, one sees that
capital exonerations were more likely in sensational cases, in cases
investigated more hurriedly, and when police officers already presumed the
suspect to have criminal proclivities.
Perhaps the most comprehensive study of wrongful convictions using a
matched comparison sample methodology to date is Brandon Garrett’s
analysis of the first two hundred innocent defendants to be released after
postconviction DNA testing exonerated them. 183 Of these, Garrett selected
a subset of non-capital cases in which a written decision was available and
matched them to a random set of non-capital cases in which DNA evidence
was not available; in the control group, then, Garrett did not know whether
the defendants were innocent or guilty. His goal was to understand how the
criminal justice system handled the cases of persons wrongly convicted but
eventually exonerated by postconviction DNA testing.
For the most part, Garrett found that postconviction claims were raised
and resolved at similar rates for both groups of defendants. Although 1% to
2% of criminal convictions are reversed on appellate review, the rate in
both sets of cases was higher—9% for the DNA exonerations and 10% for
the control group. These shared rates likely reflect the greater proportion of
rape and murder cases in both groups, the kinds of crimes in which courts
are most likely to step in and reverse a faulty conviction. But, it is
distressing to the point of tragic that the court system could have missed the
innocence of so many eventual exonerees. Recall that all of the defendants
in Garrett’s first group were exonerated by DNA testing, yet in only 9% of
the cases did the defendant win his freedom on appellate review prior to
182

Such judgments presume, of course, that capital punishment is acceptable. We leave
such questions to the many other articles on the subject and note, instead, that the issue here
is whether the criminal justice system works as intended. In this respect, we categorically
oppose any who would claim that a wrongful execution is an acceptable cost for a system of
capital punishment. See generally Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
183
Brandon Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008).
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postconviction testing. Somewhere in this, the criminal justice system
failed the innocent. Garrett’s work helps to explain why. As he describes,
“these exonerees could not effectively litigate their factual innocence, likely
due to a combination of unfavorable legal standards, unreceptive courts,
faulty criminal investigation by law enforcement, inadequate representation
at trial or afterwards, and a lack of resources for factual investigation that
might have uncovered miscarriages.” 184
Together, the studies of Harmon, Lofquist, Gross, O’Brien, and Garrett
add considerably to our knowledge of wrongful convictions while
confirming many of the sources previously identified that explain why
wrongful convictions occur and are difficult to correct. That said, there is
more that can be done to expand that knowledge base. As we have
explained elsewhere, 185 the field will benefit from additional empirical
research, continuing the pattern of matched comparison samples. These
methods would allow scholars to more accurately determine which factors
are uniquely present in wrongful conviction cases as well as to statistically
test hypotheses about which factors may be causally related to or predict
wrongful conviction. 186
Wrongful conviction cases, of course, are the most dramatic examples
of how the system got the crucial question—the guilt or innocence of the
defendant—wrong. They illustrate a breakdown in the accuracy of human
judgment at multiple levels: police investigation, prosecution, pre-trial
motions, judicial rulings, and ultimately trial verdicts. 187 Cases of rightful
acquittal, by contrast, illustrate how the criminal justice process (or at least
the court system) got it right in acquitting or dismissing charges against a
factually innocent person and thus sparing him the fate of being wrongfully
convicted. What we want to know—and thus what dictates our matching
strategy—is which factors are uniquely present in the cases that lead the
system to rightfully acquit or dismiss charges against the innocent 188 that
are not present in cases that lead the system to wrongfully convict the

184

Id. at 131.
Leo & Gould, supra note 80.
186
In the interests of full disclosure, we have just begun such a project, with funding
from the National Institute of Justice, to collect data from and compare cases of wrongful
conviction and rightful acquittal to understand which factors explain why innocent
defendants are convicted in some cases and acquitted in others. By “rightful acquittal,” we
mean factually innocent defendants who were cleared of charges following indictment but
before conviction.
187
Except, that is, in cases of wrongful conviction by plea bargain, but those matters are
comparatively rare. See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 13, at 55-56; Gross et al., supra note
45, at 537-38.
188
This is arguably the most important goal of the criminal justice system.
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innocent. 189 If we understand this, then it is a relatively short step to
understanding what policy interventions can influence the justice system to
get it right and acquit the innocent, thereby preventing future wrongful
convictions.
V. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF PROFESSIONALS, POLICYMAKERS,
AND POLITICIANS
We say a “short step” to policy intervention somewhat tongue-incheek, for identifying the most appropriate interventions and implementing
them are vastly different processes; this distinction has been noted by
several of the authors who have written about wrongful convictions. 190
Garrett, for example, is uncertain about the prospects of reform, saying that
“none will be accomplished through change in legal doctrine, but rather,
through a surprising explosion in public information about the causes of the
most egregious errors in our criminal justice system, this information will
lead to reform through the conduit of civil rights suits.” 191 Zalman, while
agreeing with Garrett about the difficulties of reform, doubts the power of
litigation to bring about systemic change. As he says, civil suits can
“initiate and highlight problems, but without other levers of change, it is
unlikely that deep policy modifications will occur.”192 A scholar of public
administration as well as criminal justice, Zalman reminds us that the
process of implementing reforms is a multifaceted mechanism, “which
extends conceptually from problem perception and agenda building, to
policy formulation, legitimation, adoption, and budgeting, and to
implementation, evaluation, and termination or redesign.” 193 Indeed, as he
says, the criminal justice system too often lacks the ability to “reflect on its
own shortcomings and to correct them.” 194
Findley extends Zalman’s critique of the criminal justice system,
claiming that reform “cannot be undertaken just by gathering lawyers
together to think about the rules that govern trials.” In Findley’s view,
change must be seen as a “holistic” process “with input from experts and

189

This is arguably the worst possible error the criminal justice system can make short of
executing the innocent.
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Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333 (2002); Garrett, supra note 183;
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stakeholders involved at every step in the process.” 195 We agree, and
indeed, the work of one of us with the Innocence Commission for Virginia,
confirms Findley’s view. “Change” does not come about simply because
researchers or commissions produce reports about the number or sources of
wrongful convictions. Rather, as political scientist John Kingdon would
explain, policy change occurs when an actor, an initiative, and a policy
window all converge at the same time. 196 To outsiders, the process may
appear as “an idea whose time has come,” but to Kingdon, policy change
does not happen by chance. Actors must still pressure decision makers with
a plausible proposal when that agenda is ripe for consideration.
Empirical research can help to “ripen” the agenda for reform, as the
publication—and publicizing—of cases of wrongful conviction can start to
create a “record” of a problem that warrants attention. In this respect, the
wrongful conviction movement has been successful in marshalling the
evidence of DNA exonerations to demand that the criminal justice system
and policymakers respond to a problem of erroneous convictions. But the
window for such reforms may be closing. Part of the reason concerns the
natural flow of policy change. According to political scientists Frank
Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, policy diffusion looks like a logistic Sshaped curve. “Policy adoption is slow at first, then very rapid, then slow
again as the saturation point is reached.” Change tends to happen quickly,
returning to long periods of equilibrium as the “attention of governmental
elites” wanes, and “the apathy of those not keenly interested in the
particular issue” allows problems to recede from the policy agenda. 197 With
wrongful convictions a key part of the national policy debate for twenty
years now, 198 we may be at a point where the issue just naturally wanes.
Indeed, since the passage of the Innocence Protection Act in 2004, 199
Congress has shown little interest in the subject.
But there is more. Arguably, it was DNA exonerations—especially
those of death row defendants—that propelled the issue of wrongful
convictions to the national agenda. DNA testing made it virtually
impossible to doubt the innocence of those exonerated, and the realization
that several of these individuals came within months or even days of
execution drew attention to the issue in a way that numerical reports could
195

Findley & Scott, supra note 131, at 341.
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198
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not. However, as DNA testing has become more commonplace at the
beginning of criminal investigations, it is arguable that there will be fewer
indisputable cases of innocence to generate attention postconviction. On
one hand, this is a tremendous accomplishment, as better forensic evidence
weeds out innocent suspects before they are indicted or convicted. But at
the same time, it may well be harder to establish innocence in the larger
percentage of cases where biological evidence is unavailable. If judges,
prosecutors, governors, and even the public have become accustomed to
equating exonerations with DNA testing, will they be so willing to see and
trust evidence of innocence when it is non-biological? If Virginia is a
guide, the future is doubtful. 200
In the end, our concern is not so much with the state of research on
wrongful convictions as it is whether professionals within the criminal
justice system will be willing to respond to that research with appropriate
initiative. To be sure, we believe that social science research has much
more it can offer to the study of wrongful convictions. But the research to
date—even with some of its natural methodological limitations—has
provided us considerable insight into the sources, consequences, and
potential remedies for wrongful convictions. It is, instead, the professionals
who staff our criminal justice system and the politicians and policymakers
who employ them that may require the more significant improvement.
Considering the interests at stake in a criminal prosecution and
conviction—especially when the crime carries a capital charge—it is
incredible to the point of embarrassing that the American system of justice
has been so resistant to innocence commissions or post-exoneration review.
This recalcitrance stands in stark relief to the openness that both the
medical profession and the transportation sector have brought to learning
from mistakes. 201 In hospitals, doctors regularly meet in morbidity and
mortality conferences to “investigate the reasons and responsibility for
adverse outcomes of care.” 202 Similarly, the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) dispatches investigators immediately after a major
transportation accident and then convenes a hearing to examine the causes
of the tragedy in order to prevent future errors. As the NTSB explains,
200

In 2008, Darrell Andrew Copeland became the first petitioner in Virginia to succeed
on a writ of actual innocence, when the Court of Appeals dismissed his conviction for felony
gun possession. According to the appeals court, more than 120 petitions for writs of actual
innocence have been rejected. Copeland is the only inmate whose petition has been
supported by the attorney general. Posting of Cjay to NowPublic, Va. Court Grants First
Writ of Actual Innocence in Chesapeake Case, http://www.nowpublic.com/world/
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more than 80% “of its recommendations have been adopted by those in a
position to effect change. Many safety features currently incorporated into
airplanes, automobiles, trains, pipelines and marine vessels had their
genesis in NTSB recommendations.” 203
If there was a good candidate for post-error review, it would be the
criminal justice system. Wrongful convictions do such harm to so many 204
that one would expect criminal justicians to seek out the lessons from past
errors in order to prevent them. And yet, experience suggests otherwise.
Only a handful of states have undertaken serious and systematic review of
wrongful convictions, 205 and when practitioners have been involved, it has
often taken “kicking and screaming” to introduce new approaches or
technologies to improve their work. 206
This level of resistance, such astounding ignorance and fear, should
not be tolerated in any profession, but nowhere is this more important than
in the criminal justice system. The stakes are simply too high to put our
heads in the sand and pretend that the research uncovered on erroneous
convictions does not warrant attention. To be sure, few would claim that
the criminal justice system fails more often than it succeeds, but success is
premised to an extent on learning from past mistakes to prevent them in the
future. Contrary to the claims of some detractors, we are not “demanding
an impossibility—a perfect system.” 207 Rather, as we have explained
before, wrongful convictions “demand the best from the state’s penal
power.” 208 Not because review will lead to an error-free process, but
because professionalism demands it.
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Looking to the future, social science research will undoubtedly expand
our understanding of wrongful convictions and system failures. But unless
criminal justice professionals, policymakers, and politicians are truly open
to these findings and are willing to adopt new measures in light of the
research, the research threatens to become, quite literally, an academic
exercise. The first century of research has taken us to a point of revelation
and burgeoning reform. Whether the next stage of investigation will be as
illuminating and valuable may depend more on practice than research.

